Tag Archives: Skepticism


problem-of-other-mindsThis is an essay I wrote back in 2009, and there’s a sense in which my having written it may have been futile. I refer not to the disdain which the general public may so sadly direct at the noble art of the philosophy essay, but to the possibility that I am the only person capable of reading it –not because of my idiosyncratic and altogether inept use of language– but because I may, for all I know, be the only sentient person in the universe. We have all considered this possibility at some point, but because it is so absurd it is easy enough to dismiss. The philosophical problem of demonstrating why we are right to dismiss it is, however, far from easy. Read the rest of this entry

The Problem of Other Minds


Are the Conditions of Belief, Truth and Justification Necessary and Sufficient for Knowledge?

World Knowledge MedalThis is an essay I wrote back in 2008. I evaluate the ‘standard analysis’ of the conditions for knowledge in the light of Gettier’s counter-examples. I cover three possible solutions: 1) redefining the conditions of knowledge (I follow especially Nozick’s conditional theory as advocated by Dancy, 1985), 2) explaining away Gettier’s refutation (particularly following Fogelin, as elaborated in Williams, 2001), and 3) radical scepticism. These positions each have merits in their own ways, but it is the conditional theory that is most plausible and as a result the elaboration of the standard analysis found in the question above should be rejected. Read the rest of this entry

On the Definition of ‘Knowledge’