(NB this article gets going with the 3rd paragraph.) Read the rest of this entry
Another essay I wrote back in 2008.
Must perception involve the conceptualisation of what is perceived?
‘Perception’ is commonly used to denote the acquisition of knowledge of an external object where the subject’s level of awareness is such that conceptualisation of that object is required. But there is dispute as to whether or not perceptual states include access to pre-conceptual components, that is, whether or not we can have perceptual knowledge of an object without conceptualising it.
Are the Conditions of Belief, Truth and Justification Necessary and Sufficient for Knowledge?
This is an essay I wrote back in 2008. I evaluate the ‘standard analysis’ of the conditions for knowledge in the light of Gettier’s counter-examples. I cover three possible solutions: 1) redefining the conditions of knowledge (I follow especially Nozick’s conditional theory as advocated by Dancy, 1985), 2) explaining away Gettier’s refutation (particularly following Fogelin, as elaborated in Williams, 2001), and 3) radical scepticism. These positions each have merits in their own ways, but it is the conditional theory that is most plausible and as a result the elaboration of the standard analysis found in the question above should be rejected. Read the rest of this entry